Traditionally, HENP computing facilities have been open facilities that are accessed in many different ways by users that are both internal and external to the facility. However, the need to protect the facility from cybersecurity threats has made it difficult to maintain the openness of the facility to off-site and on-site users. In this paper, we discuss the strategy we have used and the architecture we have developed and deployed to increase the security the US ATLAS and RHIC Computing Facilities, while trying to maintain the openness and accessibility that our user community has come to expect. Included in this discussion are the tools that we have used and the operational experience we have had with the deployed architecture.
Background
The RHIC Computing Facility (RCF) at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) is the primary data archiving and processing facility for the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) at BNL. The US ATLAS Computing Facility at BNL is the US Tier 1 computing facility for the ATLAS experiment at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. As major computing centers, these facilities provide a myriad of services to users that are on-site at BNL and off-site at collaborating institutions. These services include the archive storage of raw and analyzed data from the experiments, interactive and batch data processing services and general interactive login facilities. Traditionally, such facilities have been completely open to the Internet and have provided services, e.g. FTP (File Transfer Protocol), telnet, IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol), that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind.
An intrusion into either facility by a malicious intruder can result in damages from which recovery can be extremely costly in time and money. Some of the difficulty is associated with the enormous facility "state" represented by the 100's of terabytes of on line disk storage and the 1000's of compute nodes at the facility. However, this is not the limits of the damage. Since the facility is part of the data collection process, disruption of the facility can also result in the loss of data taking ability at each experiment. This loss is extremely costly since operating an accelerator is an expensive undertaking. Finally, because the facility is the sole archive of a substantial fraction of raw and analyzed data created by the experiments, loss of these archives from actions by malicious intruders can result in irreparable damage to on going scientific research.
Although many other computing facilities are at risk from cybersecurity incidents, two properties make the RCF and US ATLAS computing facilities high profile targets. First, the vast amounts of computing resources make the facilities appealing targets to intruders. Second, the location of the facility within a US government, Department of Energy facility, with its associated .gov top level domain makes these centers choice targets for politically motivate malicious intruders.
With the proliferation of Internet connectivity outside of the academic and research communities, the open data center architecture needs to be modified to mitigate the increased risk of cybersecurity threats.
Securing the Facility
The process of improving the security of the facilities was a multi-stage process. The first step involved the identification of assets and services at the facilities. In the second step, priorities were assigned to the identified asset or service with respect to importance. The third step was identifying the potential threats to the assets or services. The fourth step was modifying the network topology of the facility to mitigate the potential threats. The fifth step was replacing insecure services with more secure services. The sixth step was the modification of user and administrator behavior to increase the security of the facility. The seventh step was an assessment of the effectiveness of the instituted changes. The final step was the iteration of the proceeding seven steps to continue to improve the security of the facility.
Assets and Services
There are a number of assets and services at the RCF and US ATLAS computing facilities with differing security needs. The main data store, the High Performance Storage System (HPSS) [1] , contains the raw and analyzed data that is generated from the experiments. The protection of the stored data and the operation of the service are paramount to the facility. Without it, the other components of the facility are inconsequential. The service provide by HPSS is data storage and retrieval via an FTP-like mechanism. The operation of the system is effectively independent of the other assets and services in the facility.
After HPSS, the next service of importance at the facility is the authentication and authorization infras-tructure, consisting of a cluster of Network Information System (NIS) servers. Without account information, the compute farm and the NFS (Network File System) storage are unusable. As a result, the protection of this information is crucial.
At approximately equivalent levels of importance are the NFS servers and the Linux based computation farm. The NFS storage consists of approximately 150TB of disk space and 20 NFS servers. Although, extremely disruptive, loss of NFS data or service is not catastrophic. Lost unprocessed data can be restored from HPSS and lost processed data can be recovered by reprocessing the raw data. However, depending on the details of the data loss, the recovery process may be short and simple or long and complex. The Linux based computation farm consists of approximately 1100 dual CPU systems and 130TB of local storage. Loss of these systems would halt data processing and loss of data stored on the local disks would require reloading of data from the data source or the recreation of data by reprocessing. As with the NFS servers, the type of loss would dictate the cost of recovery.
The wide area accessible Andrew File System (AFS) [2] storage is at the next level of importance at the facility. Loss of this service would be inconvenient for data processing on site. Recovery of data corrupted AFS storage would entail restoration from backups, resulting in a maximum loss of about 24 hours of work. Loss of AFS service would definitely cause major disruption to work at off site locations. For on site users, loss of AFS service can, if necessary, be supplanted with NFS service.
The remaining services provided by the RCF and US ATLAS facilities include web service, Samba service, and email service. Although important for the users, these services are not coupled to the higher priority mission of the facilities, which is to provide storage and computational resources to the individual experiments.
With the assets and services at the facilities identified, an assessment of the security threats is necessary to determine the changes that need to be made to increase the security of the facilities.
Assessing the Threats
The threats to computing resources at the RCF and US ATLAS computing facilities fall into two classes, direct network assaults and compromised accounts. Examples of direct network assaults include direct attacks on network service daemons (e.g., buffer overflow exploits, protocol weaknesses), hijacking of network connections (e.g., replay attacks, forged packets), denial of service (DoS), distributed DoS, and web based attacks (both client and server). This class of attacks do not require login access on a facility system. Examples of compromised accounts include stolen or cracked passwords, social engineered access, dead accounts, and malicious insiders. This class of attacks involve gaining access to a login account at the facility from which exploits are launched. An interesting distinction between these two classes of assaults is the mitigation of network attacks can be more easily accomplished with technology and architecture changes. On the other hand, behavioral changes on the part of the system administrators or users are usually required to fix attacks in the compromised accounts class.
Facility Architecture
A modification of the facility architecture is the simpler of the two classes of changes that were made at the RCF and US ATLAS facilities. (The harder change being the modification of user and administrator behavior.) The two main goals of the architectural modifications were compartmentalization and isolation. Where possible, unrelated assets and services were separated so that security breaches in one location did result in immediate security breaches in another location. Also, where possible, network accessability to assets and services was minimized.
The core facility, consisting of the HPSS servers, NFS servers, AFS servers, NIS servers and Linux computation farm, were placed behind a firewall with a "default deny" firewall rule. With the exception of the AFS servers and AFS service, there is virtually no direct network access from the outside to the core facility. In this configuration, the experiment counting houses, where raw experiment data is generated, are placed within the firewall.
For scalability and availability, the facility firewall was a multi-component firewall, consisting of a Cisco PIX firewall, augmented by ssh [3], secure file transfer and Samba [4] (SMB) gateways. The gateways were implemented using general purpose computers running host based firewalls (ip-filter [5] or iptables [6]) on stripped down and hardened operating system installations. Each gateway system is equipped with two network interfaces (NIC), allowing them to bypass the PIX firewall, thus providing some scalability and availability. This dual NIC configuration is what dictated the need for the host based firewalls. The separation of the ssh and data transfer gateways into separate systems simplifies the hardening and maintenance of each system. It also isolates interactive login traffic with its low latency requirements from data transfers which are relatively insensitive to latency and typically result in high system load.
In conjunction with the introduction of the gateways was the elimination of all protocols with clear text passwords. FTP data transfers were replaced with scp [3], bbftp [7] , and ssh protected ftp. (The latter being normal FTP with the FTP control channel being sent through an encrypted ssh tunnel.) Interactive logins via telnet and rsh were replaced with encrypted logins via ssh. This latter change providing the additional benefit of protecting X [8] window traffic.
With the new core facility configuration, triage scenarios are possible with respect to intrusions. The first level would involve disconnecting the facility from the Internet, thus allowing on site user to work and on going operations to continue. The second level involves disconnection from the on site network. This would allow on going operations to continue, including data taking, but would cut off on site and off site users. The third level would involve the shutdown of all servers and services except for HPSS, thus halting all operation except data taking.
Located both outside and inside the facility firewall are multiple web servers. The services provided and resources used by the web servers are carefully distributed to the appropriate web server. Located outside the firewall is a non authenticating web server, serving both static and dynamic (aka CGI scripts) pages. This web server is completely stand alone, requiring no services or resources from systems inside the firewall. Two web servers are located inside the firewall, an authenticating web server and a non authenticating web server. The authenticating web server serves both static and dynamic web pages, but requires users to authenticate to the server before access is granted to the pages. (The authentication occurs over an SSL protected connection [9] .) The assumption is that authenticated users, i.e. legitimate facility users, are not malicious and will not attempt to exploit weakness that may be present in the dynamic web pages. This web server is located behind the facility firewall because of its dependence on a core facility service. The second web server located inside the firewall is a non authenticating web server that serves only static user pages. Since it depends on access to user home directories, it resides behind the firewall. To eliminate the problems associated with CGI scripts and other dynamic content, only static pages are served.
The final component of the new facility architecture was the separation of email services from the core facility. A standalone SMTP and secure IMAP server [10] was installed outside of the facility firewall. The email server utilizes a separate password database that is independent of the password database used for interactive access to the core facility. This separate database can potentially isolate the core facility from email account compromises. In addition, the use of SSL protected IMAP (replacing standard IMAP) protects email passwords while they traverse the network.
Human Factors
Architectural changes to the RCF and US AT-LAS facilities combined with technology choices significantly enhances the security of the facilities. However, a substantial amount of the security is dependent on the actions and behavior of users and administrators. As an example, benefits of encrypted ssh connections to the facility are negated if users explicitly set the X window DISPLAY variable to bypass the encrypted tunnel, or use telnet to log into the system from which he/she runs the ssh client. Similarly, system administrators can destroy site security if they are "social engineered" into providing account access to unauthenticated or unauthorized individuals.
Change user and administrator behavior primarily consists of education to make people aware of the security issues and to provide information on secure ways of doing tasks. However, education is not exceedingly effective. There is a distinct difference between awareness and understanding and theory and practice. Some behavior was enforced, for example disabling of telnet and proactive password checking with npasswd [11] . Unfortunately, most behavior cannot be enforced.
Operational Assessment
Operational experience that has been collected with the new facility architecture in place provides information about what is working and what is not. As was expected, migration to the new configuration was a long and drawn out process, much akin to changing the direction of an oil supertanker. New tools and configurations needed to be tested, documented and put into production. In addition, generous lead time was required so that users could prepare for the system changes. At this point, the facility has accomplished the first iteration of the facility hardening process outlined at the beginning of the previous section.
The critical components of the new facility are in the multicomponent firewall, since they represent the interface to the facility for the users. The most frequently used component in the firewall are the ssh gateways. Implemented using four 650MHz Intel Celeron PCs, they are each able to handle up to 80 interactive users running xterms. However, a single graphics intensive application can saturate the CPU, resulting in longer latencies for users. Additional problems have been encountered with scp data transfers on the ssh gateways. As with graphics intensive applications, a single scp session can saturate the CPU resulting in responsiveness issues for other users. The ssh gateways have subsequently been upgraded to 1.7GHz Pentium 4 systems, providing substantially improved performance.
MODT011
The FTP gateway, currently a dual 800MHz Pentium III system with dual gigabit ethernet interfaces, has been a little problematic. Getting users to use the FTP gateway was the first problem that was encountered. Over time, this has become less of an issue. An on going problem is the use of sftp and scp for bulk data transfers. As on the ssh gateways, a single sftp/scp transfer can saturate a single CPU. For a handful of power users, bbftp has worked well for bulk data transfers since only the control channel is encrypted. However, its non FTP-like user interface and its relative obscurity compared to scp and FTP are a barrier to wide spread adoption by users. Additional problems are associated with the use of NFS mounted disks as a source and destination for data files on the gateway. The performance of the NFS disk is a bottleneck for high speed transfers of individual files. The installation of local disk is an option but creates problems with disk space management. To alleviate some of the performance issues, the FTP gateway will be replaced with two dual 2.4GHz Pentium 4 systems.
For all components of the firewall, configuration and maintenance is problematic. The maintenance of the rules in the PIX firewall to handle the addition, removal, and movement of services is a significant undertaking. Judging the security of new service is particularly problematic. In addition, some services are difficult to protect with a firewall. With the hostbased firewalls, the configuration of the rules can be tricky and can result in unexpected problems.
Finally, significant work is still necessary on audit trails and intrusion detection on the various firewall components.
Future Work
Operational experience has revealed areas where modifications can be made to improve site security. In addition, the Internet and cybersecurity threats are constantly changing, as a result, defenses need to be upgraded to handle them. Since most of the security features in the new facility architectures are designed to handle the threats circa the late 1990's, work needs to be done to deal with new types of threats.
One area of work is the additional hardening of the "edge" systems, i.e., those systems that are directly accessible from the Internet. Better understanding of the issues and technologies makes it possible to better protect the systems and the facility. Examples of these changes include better firewall rules, updated software, and additional re-architecting of services to improve security and manageability.
With the proliferation of sophisticated web services, the protection of web clients from malicious web servers is also an idea to be considered. On a similar vein, proactive institution of firewall rules to mitigate the risk of the facility being a launch site of a network attack is also worth considering.
Grid Services
Looming on the horizon are issues presented by Grid [12] technology. With the Grid comes new types of security concerns. One promise of Grid technologies is the availability of global computation resources from virtually anywhere in the world. However, this also adds a new scale to the ramification of security breaches, e.g., access to global computational resources to launch distributed DoS attacks and the destruction or disabling of resources on a global scale. With the Grid, responsibilities, facilities and authorities become geographically and organizationally distributed. Command, control and communication become much more difficult.
Operationally, the phasing in of incomplete or untested Grid services into a production facility has unknown risks. Additionally, the skill sets and experience need to manage these new services do not exist and will likely result in operational errors which may have dire security consequences.
Conclusions
With a modification of the architecture of the RCF and US Atlas Tier 1 computing facilities, the replacement of insecure services with more secure services, and the education of both facility users and administrators, substantial gains in facility security have been obtained. However, security is an on going process, not an endpoint. The introduction of new requirements and services are making security harder and security breaches potentially more disastrous. Maintaining the integrity of the current security profile while growing the facility and accommodating new requirements and services will make security an increasingly difficult task.
